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Abstract: The aim of this text is to expose some of Aristotle’s ambiguities about the place 
of imagination in his conception of the soul. Furthermore, the text presents a ground on 
which they might be solved. In the first part, it illustrates the ambiguities, and indicates 
Aristotle’s awareness of it. In the second part it suggests that those ambiguities have to be 
understood and eventually solved in the field of a major conundrum, namely, the impasse 
about the parts of the soul. In this sense, it describes what I call soul’s holistic complexity, 
and proposes it as an aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the soul that might be useful in 
order to have a better understanding of Aristotle’s concept of imagination. 
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Resumen: el objetivo del texto es exponer algunas de las ambigüedades de Aristóteles 
sobre el lugar que la imaginación ocupa en su concepción del alma. Además, el texto 
presenta un terreno conceptual sobre el cual podrían ser resueltas. En la primera parte, el 
texto ilustra tales ambigüedades. En la segunda el texto sugiere que todas ellas deben ser 
comprendidas y eventualmente resueltas sobre la base de un problema mayor, a saber, el 
problema de las partes del alma. En este sentido, el texto describe lo que se ha llamado “la 
complejidad holística del alma” y la propone como un aspecto de la concepción aristotélica 
del alma que podría resultar muy útil para desarrollar una mejor comprensión del concepto 
aristotélico de imaginación.
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SOUL’S HOLISTIC COMPLEXITY AND THE PLACE OF 
THE IMAGINATION IN ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF 
THE SOUL*
INTRODUCTION
In III.3 Aristotle presents imagination as an attribute of the soul different both from 
perceiving and from thinking (427b15). However, in other passages, Aristotle also 
indicates that some thinking activities require the presence of imagination. In all 
the following passages, for instance, Aristotle suggests or even explicitly affirms the 
close relation between thinking and imagination: 
- “(…) thinking seems most of all to belong to the soul by itself; but if this is 
also some sort of imagination, or cannot be without imagination, it would 
not be possible for even this to be without the body” (403a10); 
-“(…) without it (imagination) there is no conceiving that something is the 
case” (427b15); 
- “But it is obvious that these two things cause motion, desire and/or intellect, 
if one includes imagination as an activity of the intellect” (433a10). 
It also can be quoted the following passage from On Memory and Recollection, 
“And following what was said before about imagination in the writings on the soul, 
it is not possible even to think without an image” (450a).  
* This text is the product of my doctoral research in the Ph.D program at the State University 
of New York – Stony Brook. In concrete, it was developed in my participation in the 
Aristotle’s seminar coordinated by Professor Peter Manchester during the spring semester 
of 2009. The theoretical background of the text is threefold: a) Aristotle’s own text, b) 
Thomas’s commentary on Aristotle’s book, and c) Nusbaum’s text of essays. 
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Furthermore, in III.3 Aristotle defines imagination in terms of perception, insofar 
as for him, imagination “would be a motion coming about as a result of the being-
at-work of sense perception, and corresponding to it” (429a). 
Before reaching that definition, Aristotle, by contrasting imagination to thinking 
and to perception, indicates that imagination is present in the following activities: 
• When we make images to fit things into a memory we make something appear 
before our eyes (427b20).
• When we make images of something terrifying or confidence-inspiring, 
although we do not feel the corresponding feeling (427b25).
• When we dream, images appear in some way (428a8). 
• When we do not perceive clearly, for example, that something is a human 
being, we tend to say that we imagine that it is or that it is not (428a13). 
• When our eyes are shut and visual images appear (428a15).
All these instances of actions in which imagination intervenes are, as can be 
seen, very different in kind and nature. In some of them it is not clear whether 
imagination “acts” by itself or in conjunction with perception or with intellect; 
and, if the latter options are correct, it is not clear either what the precise role and 
contribution of imagination is. 
Thus, there seems to be an ambiguity about “the place” that imagination occupies 
in Aristotle’s description of the soul. In this sense one might ask: How different 
is really imagination both from perception and intellect? Is there an independent 
and separate imaginative potency of the soul? Is imagination a lower ranked part 
or potency of Aristotle’s account of the soul? These are just some of the questions 
that such account does not seem to solve. 
The aim of this text is not to solve directly any of those problems.  Nevertheless, 
it does intend to provide some ground on which they might be solved. Therefore, 
in the first part of my text I will try, on the one hand, to illustrate the mentioned 
ambiguity, and, on the other one, to indicate Aristotle’s awareness of it.  Then, in 
the second part, I will suggest that those ambiguities have to be understood and 
eventually solved in the field of a major conundrum, namely, the impasse about the 
parts of the soul. In this sense, I describe what I call soul’s holistic complexity, and 
propose it as an aspect of Aristotle’s conception of the soul that might be useful in 
order to have a better understanding of Aristotle’s concept of imagination.  Finally, 
in the last section of my paper I present some general conclusions. 
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1.  ARISTOTLE’S ALLEGED AMBIGUITIES ABOUT IMAGINATION*
In order to illustrate the apparent lack of clarity of Aristotle’s exposition on 
imagination, three quotes can be posited. All of them are found in Book II, the 
first one in Chapter 2, and the others in Chapter 3. The context of the three 
quotes is very similar, i.e., Aristotle has enunciated his definition of the soul, and 
now he is presenting an introductory discussion about the relations between its 
potencies and how those potencies are present or absent among the different 
living things. These potencies are nutrition, perception, motion with respect to 
place, and thinking things through (414a30).  
The first quote is this one: 
(…) in the case of plants, some parts obviously live when divided and 
separated from each other, as though the soul in them is one in each plant 
in the sense of being-at-work-staying-itself but is in potency more than one, 
so too we see it happen with other capacities of the soul in the case of 
insects that have been cut in half; for each of the two parts even has both 
perception and motion with respect to place, and if it has perception, also 
imagination and appetite, since where there is perception there is also pains 
and pleasure, and where these are there is necessarily also desire (413b20). 
From this text, it seems clear that for Aristotle if a living thing has perception, it 
must have imagination as well. However, in the second quote this affirmation is 
not maintained: 
One must get clear about these things later, but for now let this much be 
said, that those living things that have touch also have appetite; it is unclear 
whether they must also have imagination, but this needs to be examined 
later (414b12).  
Here, Aristotle doubts whether or not an animal that has touch, must also have 
imagination. In the final part of this third chapter Aristotle will say that “without the 
sense of touch none of the other senses is present” (415a5). Therefore, this second 
quote seems to doubt about something that Aristotle has already categorically 
affirmed, namely, that perception implies imagination. 
Finally, the third quote states that in effect some animals despite of having 
perception, do not have imagination. In Aristotle’s words: 
* A detailed list of apparent ambiguities in Aristotle’s exposition of imagination in III.3 
that complement what I present here can be found in the article by Dorothea Frede The 
cognitive role of Phantasia in Aristotle included in Essays on Aristotle’s "De Anima", ed. 
Martha Nussbaum, p. 281. Also, the article by Malcolm Schofield, Aristotle on Imagination, 
included in the same volume (pp. 249-277), shows several apparent inconsistencies in 
Aristotle’s exposition. 
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 (…) reasoning is not present in all animals, but some do not even have 
imagination, though others live by this alone (415a10). 
In III.3, the chapter dedicated extensively to imagination, Aristotle solves this 
apparent contradiction by distinguishing imagination from perception. This 
distinction allows Aristotle to affirm that perception is present in every animal, 
while imagination is not, as it is the case of a larval worm (428a10).  
However, in III.11, Aristotle refers again explicitly to these animals. There, Aristotle 
affirms that in such animals, that are incompletely developed, perception is present 
only by touch. “But in what way could imagination be in them? Is it that, just as 
they move in an unspecific way, imagination too is present in them, but is in them 
in an unspecific form?” (434a5). This question is not solved by Aristotle, hence, 
ultimately it seems that he once again admits that every animal has imagination, 
although some of them, only have an unspecific form of it. 
From another perspective, Thomas also seems to find some sort of unclarity in 
Aristotle’s systematic exposition of imagination as it is presented in III.3. Indeed, 
in that chapter Aristotle differentiates imagination from intellect as well as from 
perception, and, finally, he states that imagination is “a motion coming about as a 
result of the being-at-work of sense perception, and corresponding to it” (429a3). 
Thomas, however, does not think that the relation among perception, intellect and 
imagination is clear insofar as Aristotle does refer to the first ones as “potencies of 
the soul”, but does not do the same in regard to imagination. For Thomas: 
Whether this movement also presupposes some potency other than the 
exterior senses, is a question which Aristotle leaves unanswered. Since, 
however, diverse acts imply diverse potencies, and diverse movements 
connote diverse receivers of movement (for the moving thing moves 
something other than itself), it seems necessary to posit an imaginative 
potency distinct from the exterior senses.*
According to Thomas, then, there must exist an imaginative potency that has 
the same status than the thinking and the perceiving ones. However, as Thomas 
himself notes it, Aristotle never affirms that such potency exists, although he never 
explicitly denies either that imagination, as a part or a power of the soul, has the 
same rank than the others just mentioned. 
One might sustain, nevertheless, that the fact that Aristotle did not treat imagination 
in the same way as he treated nutrition, perception and intellect is a clear sign that 
imagination is different from them. Indeed, for nutrition, perception and thinking, 
Aristotle follows the methodology enunciated in II.4, namely, to inquire about 
* Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. Dumb Ox Books, Notre Dame, 
Indiana, 1994, p. 203, Lecture VI, 667.
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the objects of the potencies first (food, perceptible things and intelligible things), 
and then to inquire about the activities and actions of those potencies (begetting 
offspring, perceiving and thinking). Moreover, one might also argue that Aristotle 
never mentions imagination along with the other potencies of the soul whenever 
he is apparently providing a complete list of them. For example, in II.3, Aristotle 
affirms that, 
Now of the potencies of the soul, all of those that have been mentioned 
belong to some living thing, as we said, while to others some of them 
belong, and to still others only one. The potencies we are speaking of are 
those for nutrition, perception, motion with respect to place, and thinking 
things through (414a30). 
But, do these observations imply that Thomas’s argument is wrong? For, if Thomas 
is wrong, it would be necessary to explain how it is not true, on the one hand, 
that diverse acts imply diverse potencies and, on the other one, that diverse 
movements connote diverse receivers of movement. This claim is something that 
clearly requires a more careful examination* Nevertheless, the considerations 
exposed in the last paragraph at least do strengthen the discomfort that one might 
feel when one wonders the following: if it is, as Thomas says, absolutely necessary 
to posit an imaginative potency distinct from perception, then why Aristotle did 
not do it in a clear and simple way?
  
As it was said in the introduction, the aim of this paper is not to elaborate a 
solution to this conundrum, but only to indicate Aristotle’s awareness of it, as well 
as to propose a field where, if possible, it should be solved. Both of those aspects 
may lie in the following words of Aristotle that I quote at length: 
There is immediately an impasse, both as to the sense in which one ought 
to speak of parts of the soul, and how many there are. In a certain way 
they seem unlimited in number, and not just the ones some people speak 
of, dividing it up into reasoning, spirited, and desiring parts, or as others 
do, into what has reason and the irrational part. For in accord with the 
distinctions through which they separate these parts, the soul also obviously 
has other parts farther apart than these are, and which have been spoken 
about here: the nutritive part, which belongs both to the plants and to all 
animals, and the perceptive part, which one could not easily place either as 
* Dorothea Frede, in the article quoted before presents the following reason for the 
non-existence of an independent imaginative potency: “That phantasiai, once they are 
separated from their origin, may change in quality and the object may change as well 
explains why Aristotle declares at times that most of them are false and misleading. Since 
there is no control, no special faculty in the soul,that ‘keeps them in order’, phantasiai can 
become mere appearances that drift in and out of our consciousness, reappear in dreams, 
or delude us in a state of fever. For that very reason Aristotle does not treat the phantastike 
as a separate faculty of the soul, but regards it as a phenomenon that supervenes on sense-
perception” (p. 285).
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irrational or as having reason, and also the imaginative part, though whether 
it is the same or different from any of them is a major impasse, if one is 
going to set down the parts of the soul as separate, and in addition to these 
the appetitive part which would seem to be different from them all both 
in its articulation and in its potency. And it is surely absurd to tear the soul 
apart in this way, since wishing ends up in the reasoning part, but desire and 
spiritedness in the irrational part; and if the soul is three things, there will be 
appetite in each of them (432a25).
On the one hand, Aristotle indicates one more time the impasse identified from 
Book I about whether or not the soul can be said to have parts. On the other 
one, Aristotle explicitly affirms that this impasse is closely related to the problem 
of distinguishing imagination from the perceptive and intellectual potencies of 
the soul. According to Aristotle, then, the “place” of the imagination in the soul 
will always be problematic as long as we continue thinking that the soul is in fact 
divided in parts as if they were distinct and separate places. 
Hence, the ground on which the conundrums pertaining imagination might be 
solved is Aristotle’s proposal of conceiving that the soul is not divided or separated 
in the way mentioned. In other words, imagination’s nature and function in 
Aristotle’s systematic exposition demands that we understand what might be 
called “soul’s holistic complexity”. 
2. SOUL’S HOLISTIC COMPLEXITY 
In Aristotle’s list of impasses he states that “one must also examine whether it (the 
soul) is divisible or without parts, and whether all soul is of the same kind, or, if 
it is not of the same kind, whether souls differ as forms of one general class, or in 
their general classes” (402b).
The solution to this impasse, and the explanation of what “soul’s holistic complexity” 
means can be found in II.3. There, Aristotle indicates that despite of their divisions, 
soul’s potencies are always integrated within a single, unitary soul. For this reason, 
the potency for nutrition is different in plants and in animals, insofar as in the latter 
we can also find the potency for perception that, in someway, redefine the ways in 
which nutrition is put to work. In this sense, in the case of animals nutrition could 
be described in perceptual terms, and, in the case of humans, nutrition would 
always be informed by intellect. By the same token, we would have to be able to 
recognize how intellectual is perception (or how perceptual is thinking) of a being 
that has both the thinking potency and the perceiving one. 
Almost at the end of Book I, Aristotle indicates that the conception of the soul 
according to which “it has parts, and thinks by means of one part but desires by 
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means of another” (411b5) faces the problem of explaining how, and by what 
aspect, the soul, as a whole, is hold together. In Aristotle’s words:  
For it is surely not the body, for it seems rather to be the soul, on the contrary, 
that holds the body together; at any rate, when the soul has gone out of it, 
the body gives off vapors and rots away. So if some other thing makes it be 
one, that would be the thing most properly meant by soul. But about that 
thing in turn, it would be necessary to inquire whether it is one or has many 
parts. For if it is one, why is not the soul also one right from the start? But 
if it is divided, the argument will again ask what holds together, and so will 
proceed to infinity (411b8-15).
Right after this observation, Aristotle also affirms that this view of the soul also 
faces the problem of explaining how those separate parts of the soul affect and 
are related to the body; something very difficult to do especially for the intellect. 
According to Aristotle, “(…) if the soul holds together all of the body, it would be 
appropriate for each of its parts to hold together some part of the body. But this 
seems impossible, for what sort of part the intellect would hold together, and in 
what way, is difficult even to invent” (411b15-20). 
Hence, although for some potencies of the soul it is possible to realize a clear 
tripartite exposition as indicated by Aristotle in II.4 (potency – activity – object), 
the Aristotelian soul is characterized by a “holistic complexity”, which means 
that the soul is always a systematic whole in which the presence or absence of a 
potency determines the operation of the other ones.  
A concrete paragraph that shows this notion of holistic complexity can be found in 
III.4, more exactly in 429b10 – 429b25. In that paragraph, Aristotle contrasts two 
kinds of objects, i.e., sensible objects, on the one hand, and their thinghoods, on the 
other one. Moreover, Aristotle also contrasts two potencies, i,e., one that distinguishes 
“being-flesh”, namely the thinking potency, and one that distinguishes “flesh”. 
Aristotle also mentions that perception is the potency that distinguishes the objects 
of the senses, that is, hot, cold, etc. But he does not say explicitly and clearly that 
perception is the potency that distinguishes “flesh”. In this sense, although flesh 
is not the same as “being-flesh”, it is not either the same as a simple aggregate of 
colors, tastes, sounds, flavors, etc, for flesh, “in reality”, is a matter-form compound. 
For Aristotle, “Flesh is not present without material, but like a snub nose, it is this 
in that” (429b15).
Aristotle explicitly affirms that “…being flesh is distinguished either by a different 
potency from the one that distinguishes flesh, or by the same one in a different 
relation” (429b12). But it has to be noticed that Aristotle never closes this dilemma. 
Based on this, we could interpret that both alternatives are correct, though we 
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have to understand that, in the first case, namely the case of a “different potency” 
than intellect, Aristotle would be talking about perception, though in the broad 
sense that includes the perception of the incidental sensible in conjunction with 
the intellect. Only in this way, this first alternative is equivalent to the second one, 
namely, “the same potency in a different relation”; which means, once again, 
intellect in combination with perception. Accordingly, for Charles H. Kahn,  
Whereas an essence can be the object only of nous, the perception of the 
corresponding matter–form compound (flesh as a certain ratio of hot and 
cold, etc.) can be thought of in either of two ways: as the work of sense 
broadly understood (since the matter of flesh is properly sensible, and the 
compound body is a ‘sensible thing’, a sensible per accidens); or as the work 
of nous in a complex way (like a line bent in two). Thus nous is consistently 
presented as the capacity to apprehend forms and essences: both forms 
as embodied and forms alone, both forms in sensible compounds and in 
mathematical abstraction.*
In this sense, what I have called “soul’s holistic complexity” is an aspect of Aristotle’s 
conception that must be seriously taken into account in any interpretation of 
his treatise. Indeed, such aspect avoids that Aristotle’s divisions of the soul be 
taken as if Aristotle were proceeding atomistically, that is, from elementary parts 
to composite ones. Moreover, it cannot be forgotten that besides soul’s division 
into nutritive, perceiving and intellectual potency, Aristotle also distinguishes “two 
potencies of living things, that of discriminating, which is the work of reasoning and 
of sense perception, and that of causing motion with respect to place” (432a15). 
 
CONCLUSION. SOUL’S HOLISTIC COMPLEXITY AND 
IMAGINATION 
In the concrete case of imagination, soul’s holistic complexity might provide a 
useful tool to interpret the ambiguous and somehow dual character that Aristotle 
attributes it. Furthermore, it would help to explain why for Aristotle it was not 
so necessary to posit, as Thomas claims, an imaginative potency distinct from 
perception. In other words, the question about imagination’s clearly established 
place in Aristtotle’s conception of the soul does not take into account that in such 
conception, no part of the soul really has a unique and determined place.
In the same vein, soul’s holistic complexity might provide useful tools to interpret 
the final chapters of On The Soul. Indeed, in those chapters, when Aristotle is 
explaining soul’s potency to cause motion with respect to place, imagination 
reappears. But what is particularly interesting in these chapters is that Aristotle 
* KAHN, Charles, Aristotle on Thinking in “Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima”, ed. Martha 
Nussbaum, p. 371. 
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explicitly refers to two possible kinds of imagination, namely, one rational and one 
sensory (433b30), the first one present in humans, and the latter present in the 
other animals. In Aristotle words, “So a sensory imagination, as was said, is present 
in the rest of the animals, while there is a deliberative imagination in those that can 
reason” (434a5-10). An atomistic view of the soul might find difficulties to explain 
the existence of a sensory imagination and a deliberative one. Also, it might not 
be able to understand how a deliberative imagination can exist if imagination was 
defined as a movement resulting from perception. 
Finally, soul’s holistic complexity might help us to understand, in the case of 
human soul, how imagination establishes a crucial connection between intellect 
and perception, insofar as, for Aristotle, images are necessary both for practical 
and for theoretical reasoning, as it is indicated in the final chapters of On The 
Soul. Therefore, the systematic approach to imagination developed by Aristotle 
that tries to explain so many and diverse psychological phenomena that may be 
associated together under one general concept, should not be misunderstood by 
positing an atomistic conception that clearly is not Aristotle’s Φ  
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